SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION AND ORDER
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION AND ORDER
08 Civ. 3305 (SAS) (dated April 6, 2010)
-against-
NEW YORK STATE; OFFICE OF COURT
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNIFIED
COURT SYSTEM OF NEW YORK;
THOMAS J. CAHILL, individually and in
his official capacity; SHERRY M. COHEN,
individually and in her official capacity;
GARY L. CASELLA, individually and in his
official capacity; EVE MARKEWICH,
individually and as a partner of BLANK
ROME LLP; FRANK STRENG,
individually and as a partner of
McCARTHY FINGAR LLP; DEBORAH
McCARTHY; JOEL AURNOU; WILLIAM
GRIFFIN, individually and as a co-owner of
HUDSON VALLEY BANK; LAURA
WERNER, individually and in her official
capacity; ANTHONY SCARPINO,
individually and in his official capacity;
CHARLES SCOTT, individually and in his
official capacity; and JOHN/JANE DOE,
DOE COMPANY 1-20,
Defendants.
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Pamela Carvel, proceeding pro se, brought suit against the above named defendants pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”),1 alleging various constitutional violations including the denial of due process and equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Carvel also asserts a number of state law claims.3 The instant case, along with five other cases, were filed as related to Anderson v. State of New York, 07 Civ. 9599 (SAS).4 On August 8, 2008, this Court dismissed this and the five other actions in an omnibus Opinion and Order.5 Carvel appealed to the Second Circuit which, on March 12, 2010, issued a Summary Order, affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding this case to this Court.6
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in all aspects but one, stating as follows:
we cannot affirm the District Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations under §1983. Plaintiff alleges a “strong appearance of bribery” surrounding $400,000 in loans given to Justice Scarpino. App. 26 (Compi. 7~ 69-70). Although Justice Scarpino enjoys the benefit of absolute judicial immunity from that claim, the other defendants involved in the alleged “bribery” scheme do not. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980). Because the District Court did not explicitly address this claim before dismissing it sua sponte, we lack a basis on which to affirm its dismissal. We therefore vacate the dismissal with respect to the “bribery” claim and remand for the District Court to address Ihe claim in the first instance.7 This Court must therefore apply the holding of Dennis v. Sparks8 to plaintiff’s allegations and determine whether any part of her conspiracy claim should survive.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss
The first question is whether plaintiff’s allegations meet the plausibility standard recently adopted by the Supreme Court. In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint”9 and “draw all reasonable inferences in [the] plaintiffs favor.”10 However, a court need not accord “[l]egal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations . . . a presumption of truthfulness.”11 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must show that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief.’12 A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”13 Plausibility “is not akin to a probability requirement,” rather plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”14
B. Conspiracy Under Section 1983
In order to survive a motion to dismiss a section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(I) an agreement between [two or more state actors or] a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”5 “Thus, a plaintiff must show that defendants acted in a willful manner, culminating in an agreement, understanding or meeting of the minds, that violated [his] rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal courts.”6 “In addition, ‘complaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed.”7 While conclusory allegations may be insufficient, “conspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations,’ and may have to be proven by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.”8 Finally, “[a] violated constitutional right is a natural prerequisite to a claim of conspiracy to violate such right.”9 “Without deprivation of a federal constitutional right, ‘there can be no civil rights conspiracy to deprive that right.”20 Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege a constitutional deprivation.
III. DISCUSSION
A. In General
Because plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is prolix and often vague and repetitive, it is difficult to decipher the parameters of the alleged conduct that resulted in particular constitutional violations. However, the thrust of plaintiffs numerous allegations can be summarized as follows: After the suspicious death of plaintiffs uncle, ice cream magnate Thomas Carvel, his multimillion dollar estate was plundered by private attorneys, assisted by various employees of the state court system, to the financial and emotional detriment of his wife, Agnes Carvel, now deceased,2’ and plaintiff, his surviving niece.22 In sum, plaintiff alleges that individual defendants William Griffin, Eve Markewich, Frank Streng, Deborah McCarthy, and Joel Aurnou (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), all of whom are attorneys in private practice, colluded with Justice Anthony Scarpino of the Westchester County Surrogate’s Court, and other state employee defendants, to “engage in tax fraud, charity fraud, covert agreements, conversion, and fraudulent transfers of Pamela Carvel ‘s assets and other Carvel assets to themselves and their agents, so as to defraud Pamela Carvel as client, fiduciary, creditor, beneficiary, and charitable benefactor.”23
B. The Alleged Bribery
Carvel further alleges that Griffin, Markewich, Streng, McCarthy, and Aurnou “entered into covert verbal and written agreements in the Southern District, orchestrated, endorsed, or condoned by Defendants Scarpino, Scott, and Werner, to withhold ALL funds from Pamela Carvel (and the Carvel family) as fiduciary, creditor, asset owner, and benefactor.”24 Plaintiff also alleges a “strong appearance of bribery” surrounding $400,000 in “loans” given to Justice Scarpino from Hudson Valley Bank, a bank in which Griffin is the controlling shareholder. As stated by plaintiff: Streng entered the picture only when the matters in Thomas Carvel’s estate were going to trial before Surrogate Scarpino. Defendant Scarpino failed to disclose conflicts with Streng and a strong appearance of bribey through about $400,000 in “loans” from Hudson Valley Bank, controlled by Griffin, who was appearing before Scarpino as witness and adverse litigant against Pamela.
Public records appear to show that Scarpino was given a $100,000 “loan” by Hudson Valley Bank prior to taking office. Neither Scarpino, nor Markewich, nor Streng, nor McCarthy, nor Aurnou, nor Griffin, ever revealed to Plaintiff Pamela Carvel that Griffin’s Hudson Valley Bank gave Scarpino that loan or additional loans. Griffin’s Hudson Valley Bank gave Scarpino another $200,000 “loan” in October 2001 to coincide with commencement of the first trials in Thomas Carvel’s estate. None of the Defendants revealed [that] yet another $100,000 “loan” in December2004 was given to Scarpino by Griffin’s Hudson Valley Bank just prior to the commencement of trials in Agnes Carvel’s estate.25
Plaintiff claims that as a result of this alleged bribery, Scarpino denied plaintiffs request for a trial by jury.26 Furthermore, two days before plaintiffs opposition to a motion for accounting and legal fees was due in the Thomas Carvel case, Streng moved to withdraw his law firm, McCarthy Fingar, from representing plaintiff, leaving her without legal representation.27 Despite Scarpino’s previous recusal in the McKeown case because of his close relationship with Streng, Scarpino did not decline to decide Streng’s motion to withdraw in Carvel’s case.28 Plaintiff further alleges that Scarpino and Streng corruptly agreed to apply Streng’s withdrawal of representation in the Thomas Carvel case to other matters, thereby depriving Pamela Carvel of due process.29
C. Plaintiff’s Alleged Injuries
It appears that plaintiff could properly allege a plausible section 1983 conspiracy claim, at least as to Griffin. According to plaintiff, Paul Amicucci is a member of Griffin’s law firm. After Agnes Carvel’s death, Griffin, allegedly acting on behalf of the Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation, sold Agnes Carvel’s 19-acre residence in Ardsley, New York, to Amicucci’s brother for two million dollars in 2006, although it was worth ten million dollars.3° On the same day, Amicucci’s shell company assigned the whole property back to Griffin through Hudson Valley Bank as a lease assignment for security for a mortgage from Hudson Valley Bank.31
Upon plaintiff’s discovery of these transactions in 2007, this “real estate scheme” was brought before Justice Scarpino who allegedly “did nothing.”32 With further elaboration, Scarpino’s handling of this “real estate scheme” may be a sufficient overt act done with the intention of causing plaintiff to be deprived of property without due process.33 These allegations could, with further elaboration, sufficiently allege the agreement and acting in concert elements of a section 1983 conspiracy claim, at least between Griffin and Scarpino, when coupled with the above-mentioned bribery allegations concerning $400,000 in “loans” made to Scarpino by the Hudson Valley Bank. Moreover, Griffin could be deemed to be a state actor under Dennis v. Sparks given his alleged collusion with a state-court judge who, but for absolute judicial immunity, would also be a defendant in this action.34 The question, then, is whether plaintiff can allege sufficient facts so as to include Griffin and the remaining Individual Defendants in a conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights.
In sum, the remaining individual Defendants could also be deemed to be state actors if there is a sufficient factual basis to conclude that they conspired with Justice Scarpino, or any other state actor, to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right. However, the Complaint fails to adequately plead how plaintiff was deprived of her property without due process and what the Individual Defendants allegedly did, with whom, when, and what corresponding constitutional injury it caused.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, plaintiff’s section 1983 conspiracy claim is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may amend her Complaint against the Individual Defendants within the next thirty (30) days.35 An amended Complaint must contain specific factual allegations, consistent with this Supplemental Opinion and Order, detailing the various conspiracies in which each of the Individual Defendants allegedly engaged and that resulted in a constitutional violation.36 The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to reinstate this case to my active docket as to defendants Griffin, Markewich, Streng, McCarthy, and Aurnou.
Leave to amend should be freely granted when “justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). This rule is especially applicable to pro se litigants. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Scm’. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) @er curiam) (stating that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed without granting leave to amend when a liberal reading of such complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated”) (quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Although Gomez pre-dates the plausibility standard announced in Twoinbly and elaborated upon in Iqbal, the standard for granting leave to amend, albeit somewhat less relaxed now, must still permit pro se litigants at least one chance to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
I decline defendant Markewich’s suggestion to stay this case pending a decision on a motion to dismiss filed in a subsequently commenced district court action, Carvel v. Ross, 09 Civ. 722 (LAK). See 3/17/10 Letter from Philip Touitou, counsel to Markewich, at I.
Dated: New York, New York
April 6, 2010
28. See id. ¶ 77. According to plaintiff Scarpino, in a written decision, “specifically denied responsibility over ethical and professional complaints against Streng and his firm.” fd. ¶ 24. Plaintiff fails to explain the significance of how and when Scarpino “denied responsibility” for Streng’s conduct and how this alleged denial violated any of her constitutional rights.
29. Id. . ¶ 77.
30. Id. . ¶ 84.
31. Id. . See id. Plaintiff does not identify to whom the mortgage from Hudson Valley Bank was made.
32. Id. ¶ 85. Once again, plaintiff fails to identify how this “real estate scheme” was presented to Justice Scarpino.
33. For example, plaintiff fails to explain the basis of her property interest in her aunt’s residence. Presumably, Pamela Carvel was the beneficiary, or a beneficiary, of Agnes Carvel’s estate but this is not specifically alleged in connection with the Ardsley residence.
PAMELA CARVEL, Plaintiff,
-against-
NEW YORK STATE; OFFICE OF COURT
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNIFIED
COURT SYSTEM OF NEW YORK;
THOMAS J. CAHILL, individually and in
his official capacity; SHERRY M. COHEN,
individually and in her official capacity;
GARY L. CASELLA, individually and in his
official capacity; EVE MARKEWICH,
individually and as a partner of BLANK
ROME LLP; FRANK STRENG,
individually and as a partner of
McCARTHY FINGAR LLP; DEBORAH
McCARTHY; JOEL AURNOU; WILLIAM
GRIFFIN, individually and as a co-owner of
HUDSON VALLEY BANK; LAURA
WERNER, individually and in her official
capacity; ANTHONY SCARPINO,
individually and in his official capacity;
CHARLES SCOTT, individually and in his
official capacity; and JOHN/JANE DOE,
DOE COMPANY 1-20,
Defendants.
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Pamela Carvel, proceeding pro se, brought suit against the above named defendants pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”),1 alleging various constitutional violations including the denial of due process and equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Carvel also asserts a number of state law claims.3 The instant case, along with five other cases, were filed as related to Anderson v. State of New York, 07 Civ. 9599 (SAS).4 On August 8, 2008, this Court dismissed this and the five other actions in an omnibus Opinion and Order.5 Carvel appealed to the Second Circuit which, on March 12, 2010, issued a Summary Order, affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding this case to this Court.6
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in all aspects but one, stating as follows:
we cannot affirm the District Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations under §1983. Plaintiff alleges a “strong appearance of bribery” surrounding $400,000 in loans given to Justice Scarpino. App. 26 (Compi. 7~ 69-70). Although Justice Scarpino enjoys the benefit of absolute judicial immunity from that claim, the other defendants involved in the alleged “bribery” scheme do not. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980). Because the District Court did not explicitly address this claim before dismissing it sua sponte, we lack a basis on which to affirm its dismissal. We therefore vacate the dismissal with respect to the “bribery” claim and remand for the District Court to address Ihe claim in the first instance.7 This Court must therefore apply the holding of Dennis v. Sparks8 to plaintiff’s allegations and determine whether any part of her conspiracy claim should survive.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss
The first question is whether plaintiff’s allegations meet the plausibility standard recently adopted by the Supreme Court. In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint”9 and “draw all reasonable inferences in [the] plaintiffs favor.”10 However, a court need not accord “[l]egal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations . . . a presumption of truthfulness.”11 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must show that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief.’12 A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”13 Plausibility “is not akin to a probability requirement,” rather plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”14
B. Conspiracy Under Section 1983
In order to survive a motion to dismiss a section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(I) an agreement between [two or more state actors or] a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”5 “Thus, a plaintiff must show that defendants acted in a willful manner, culminating in an agreement, understanding or meeting of the minds, that violated [his] rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal courts.”6 “In addition, ‘complaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed.”7 While conclusory allegations may be insufficient, “conspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations,’ and may have to be proven by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.”8 Finally, “[a] violated constitutional right is a natural prerequisite to a claim of conspiracy to violate such right.”9 “Without deprivation of a federal constitutional right, ‘there can be no civil rights conspiracy to deprive that right.”20 Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege a constitutional deprivation.
III. DISCUSSION
A. In General
Because plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is prolix and often vague and repetitive, it is difficult to decipher the parameters of the alleged conduct that resulted in particular constitutional violations. However, the thrust of plaintiffs numerous allegations can be summarized as follows: After the suspicious death of plaintiffs uncle, ice cream magnate Thomas Carvel, his multimillion dollar estate was plundered by private attorneys, assisted by various employees of the state court system, to the financial and emotional detriment of his wife, Agnes Carvel, now deceased,2’ and plaintiff, his surviving niece.22 In sum, plaintiff alleges that individual defendants William Griffin, Eve Markewich, Frank Streng, Deborah McCarthy, and Joel Aurnou (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), all of whom are attorneys in private practice, colluded with Justice Anthony Scarpino of the Westchester County Surrogate’s Court, and other state employee defendants, to “engage in tax fraud, charity fraud, covert agreements, conversion, and fraudulent transfers of Pamela Carvel ‘s assets and other Carvel assets to themselves and their agents, so as to defraud Pamela Carvel as client, fiduciary, creditor, beneficiary, and charitable benefactor.”23
B. The Alleged Bribery
Carvel further alleges that Griffin, Markewich, Streng, McCarthy, and Aurnou “entered into covert verbal and written agreements in the Southern District, orchestrated, endorsed, or condoned by Defendants Scarpino, Scott, and Werner, to withhold ALL funds from Pamela Carvel (and the Carvel family) as fiduciary, creditor, asset owner, and benefactor.”24 Plaintiff also alleges a “strong appearance of bribery” surrounding $400,000 in “loans” given to Justice Scarpino from Hudson Valley Bank, a bank in which Griffin is the controlling shareholder. As stated by plaintiff: Streng entered the picture only when the matters in Thomas Carvel’s estate were going to trial before Surrogate Scarpino. Defendant Scarpino failed to disclose conflicts with Streng and a strong appearance of bribey through about $400,000 in “loans” from Hudson Valley Bank, controlled by Griffin, who was appearing before Scarpino as witness and adverse litigant against Pamela.
Public records appear to show that Scarpino was given a $100,000 “loan” by Hudson Valley Bank prior to taking office. Neither Scarpino, nor Markewich, nor Streng, nor McCarthy, nor Aurnou, nor Griffin, ever revealed to Plaintiff Pamela Carvel that Griffin’s Hudson Valley Bank gave Scarpino that loan or additional loans. Griffin’s Hudson Valley Bank gave Scarpino another $200,000 “loan” in October 2001 to coincide with commencement of the first trials in Thomas Carvel’s estate. None of the Defendants revealed [that] yet another $100,000 “loan” in December2004 was given to Scarpino by Griffin’s Hudson Valley Bank just prior to the commencement of trials in Agnes Carvel’s estate.25
Plaintiff claims that as a result of this alleged bribery, Scarpino denied plaintiffs request for a trial by jury.26 Furthermore, two days before plaintiffs opposition to a motion for accounting and legal fees was due in the Thomas Carvel case, Streng moved to withdraw his law firm, McCarthy Fingar, from representing plaintiff, leaving her without legal representation.27 Despite Scarpino’s previous recusal in the McKeown case because of his close relationship with Streng, Scarpino did not decline to decide Streng’s motion to withdraw in Carvel’s case.28 Plaintiff further alleges that Scarpino and Streng corruptly agreed to apply Streng’s withdrawal of representation in the Thomas Carvel case to other matters, thereby depriving Pamela Carvel of due process.29
C. Plaintiff’s Alleged Injuries
It appears that plaintiff could properly allege a plausible section 1983 conspiracy claim, at least as to Griffin. According to plaintiff, Paul Amicucci is a member of Griffin’s law firm. After Agnes Carvel’s death, Griffin, allegedly acting on behalf of the Thomas and Agnes Carvel Foundation, sold Agnes Carvel’s 19-acre residence in Ardsley, New York, to Amicucci’s brother for two million dollars in 2006, although it was worth ten million dollars.3° On the same day, Amicucci’s shell company assigned the whole property back to Griffin through Hudson Valley Bank as a lease assignment for security for a mortgage from Hudson Valley Bank.31
Upon plaintiff’s discovery of these transactions in 2007, this “real estate scheme” was brought before Justice Scarpino who allegedly “did nothing.”32 With further elaboration, Scarpino’s handling of this “real estate scheme” may be a sufficient overt act done with the intention of causing plaintiff to be deprived of property without due process.33 These allegations could, with further elaboration, sufficiently allege the agreement and acting in concert elements of a section 1983 conspiracy claim, at least between Griffin and Scarpino, when coupled with the above-mentioned bribery allegations concerning $400,000 in “loans” made to Scarpino by the Hudson Valley Bank. Moreover, Griffin could be deemed to be a state actor under Dennis v. Sparks given his alleged collusion with a state-court judge who, but for absolute judicial immunity, would also be a defendant in this action.34 The question, then, is whether plaintiff can allege sufficient facts so as to include Griffin and the remaining Individual Defendants in a conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights.
In sum, the remaining individual Defendants could also be deemed to be state actors if there is a sufficient factual basis to conclude that they conspired with Justice Scarpino, or any other state actor, to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right. However, the Complaint fails to adequately plead how plaintiff was deprived of her property without due process and what the Individual Defendants allegedly did, with whom, when, and what corresponding constitutional injury it caused.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, plaintiff’s section 1983 conspiracy claim is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may amend her Complaint against the Individual Defendants within the next thirty (30) days.35 An amended Complaint must contain specific factual allegations, consistent with this Supplemental Opinion and Order, detailing the various conspiracies in which each of the Individual Defendants allegedly engaged and that resulted in a constitutional violation.36 The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to reinstate this case to my active docket as to defendants Griffin, Markewich, Streng, McCarthy, and Aurnou.
Leave to amend should be freely granted when “justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). This rule is especially applicable to pro se litigants. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Scm’. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) @er curiam) (stating that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed without granting leave to amend when a liberal reading of such complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated”) (quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Although Gomez pre-dates the plausibility standard announced in Twoinbly and elaborated upon in Iqbal, the standard for granting leave to amend, albeit somewhat less relaxed now, must still permit pro se litigants at least one chance to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
I decline defendant Markewich’s suggestion to stay this case pending a decision on a motion to dismiss filed in a subsequently commenced district court action, Carvel v. Ross, 09 Civ. 722 (LAK). See 3/17/10 Letter from Philip Touitou, counsel to Markewich, at I.
Dated: New York, New York
April 6, 2010
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN,
U.S.D.J.
Appearances -Plaintiff (Pro Se):
Pamela Carvel
110 West Ninth Street, Suite 177
Wilmington, DE 19801-1618
For Defendant Markewich:
Philip Touitou, Esq.
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP
780 Third Avenue, 4t1~ Floor
New York, NY 10017 (212) 471-6211
For Defendants Frank Streng and Joel Aurnou:
Joseph J. Brophy, Esq.
McCarthy Fingar LLP
11 Martine Avenue, I 2th Floor
White Plains, NY 10606 (914) 946-3700
FOOTNOTES:
1. Section 1983 states as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 172-203.
4. See Esposito v. State of New York, 07 Civ. 11612 (SAS); Bernstein v.Appellate Div. First Dep ‘t Departmental Disciplinary Comm., 07 Civ. 11196(SAS); McKeown v. State of New York, 08 Civ. 2391 (SAS); McCormick v. State of New York, 08 Civ. 4438 (SAS); and Capogrosso v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 08 Civ. 5455 (SAS).
5. See Esposito, et at v. State of New York, Nos. 07 Civ. 11612, 08 Civ. 2391, 08 Civ. 3305, 08 Civ. 4438, 08 Civ. 5455, 08 Civ. 6368, 2008 WL 3523910 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008). This Opinion also dismissed Peterec-Tolino v. State of New York, 08 Civ. 6368 (SAS). Bernstein was decided in a separate Opinion and Order, also dated August 8, 2008. See Bernstein v. State of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 448, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissing remaining defendants sua sponte, and denying leave to amend). Carvel, McCormick, Capogrosso, and Petrec-Tolino were dismissed sua sponte while Esposito and McKeown were dismissed pursuant to motions to dismiss, On appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal in Bernstein and affirmed this Court in Esposito, Capogrosso, and Peterec-Tolino by Summary Order. No appeal was taken in McCormick while the appeal in McKeown is pending.
6. See Carvel v. New York, No. 08-4576-CV, 2010 WL 889326, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2010).
7. Id. at *1.
8. In Dennis, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether private parties accused of conspiring with a judge could be deemed to be acting “under color of’ state law for purposes of section 1983. See 449 U.S. at 27-28. In answering this question, the Supreme Court stated that:
to act “under color of’ state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting “under color” of law for purposes of § 1983 actions. Of course, merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or ajoint actor with the judge. But here the allegations were that an official act of the defendantjudge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge. Under these allegations, the private parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state law; and it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability. Immunity does not change the character of the judge’s action or that of his co-conspirators. . . . Private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such conduct are thus acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 as it has been construed in our prior cases.
Id. at 27-29 (footnotes and citations omitted, emphasis added).
9. Bell At/i Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). Accord Rescuecoin Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009).
10. Ofori-Tenkorang v. American Int’l Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 2006).
11. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
12. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“[WJe do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).
13. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
15. Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)).
16. Bussey v. Phillips, 419 F. Supp. 2d 569, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in original).
17. Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 325 (quoting Dwares v. City of N.Y., 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted)).
18. Pangburn, 200 F.3d at 65 (quoting Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1994)).
19. Romer v. Morgenthau, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Thus, if a plaintiff cannot sufficiently allege a violation of his rights, it follows that he cannot sustain a claim of conspiracy to violate those rights.”).
20. Bussey, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (quoting Young v. County of Fulton,160 F.3d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1998)). Accord Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff 63F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that a section 1983 conspiracy claim “will stand only insofar as the plaintiff can prove the sine qua non of a § 1983 action: the violation of a federal right”) (citing Adickes v. 5.11. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
150 (1970)).
21. Plaintiff claims that Agnes’s death on August 4, 1998, was caused by a stroke “procured deliberately by stress from [defendant Williamj Griffin instigated through [the] Surrogate’s Court.” Compl. ¶ 62.
22. See id. ¶ 6 (“Defendants as individual lawyers, in various positions, created or furthered systemic corruption in New York State for the purpose of furthering deceptions to steal control of the Carvel family’s. . . assets — to the total exclusion of the legitimate asset owners and their successors in interest.”); ¶ 7 (“The fundamental mechanism that makes such corruption possible is the deprivation to Pamela Carvel (and others) of all legitimate avenues of redress of grievances or judicial abuses because of intentional and negligent collusion by State employees charged with protection of Pamela Carvel (and all other citizens).”).
23. Id. . ¶ 11
24. Id. . ¶ 29
25. Id. . ¶ 69-70.
26. Id. . ¶ 71.
27. Id. . ¶ 75
Appearances -Plaintiff (Pro Se):
Pamela Carvel
110 West Ninth Street, Suite 177
Wilmington, DE 19801-1618
For Defendant Markewich:
Philip Touitou, Esq.
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP
780 Third Avenue, 4t1~ Floor
New York, NY 10017 (212) 471-6211
For Defendants Frank Streng and Joel Aurnou:
Joseph J. Brophy, Esq.
McCarthy Fingar LLP
11 Martine Avenue, I 2th Floor
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FOOTNOTES:
1. Section 1983 states as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 172-203.
4. See Esposito v. State of New York, 07 Civ. 11612 (SAS); Bernstein v.Appellate Div. First Dep ‘t Departmental Disciplinary Comm., 07 Civ. 11196(SAS); McKeown v. State of New York, 08 Civ. 2391 (SAS); McCormick v. State of New York, 08 Civ. 4438 (SAS); and Capogrosso v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 08 Civ. 5455 (SAS).
5. See Esposito, et at v. State of New York, Nos. 07 Civ. 11612, 08 Civ. 2391, 08 Civ. 3305, 08 Civ. 4438, 08 Civ. 5455, 08 Civ. 6368, 2008 WL 3523910 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008). This Opinion also dismissed Peterec-Tolino v. State of New York, 08 Civ. 6368 (SAS). Bernstein was decided in a separate Opinion and Order, also dated August 8, 2008. See Bernstein v. State of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 448, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissing remaining defendants sua sponte, and denying leave to amend). Carvel, McCormick, Capogrosso, and Petrec-Tolino were dismissed sua sponte while Esposito and McKeown were dismissed pursuant to motions to dismiss, On appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal in Bernstein and affirmed this Court in Esposito, Capogrosso, and Peterec-Tolino by Summary Order. No appeal was taken in McCormick while the appeal in McKeown is pending.
6. See Carvel v. New York, No. 08-4576-CV, 2010 WL 889326, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2010).
7. Id. at *1.
8. In Dennis, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether private parties accused of conspiring with a judge could be deemed to be acting “under color of’ state law for purposes of section 1983. See 449 U.S. at 27-28. In answering this question, the Supreme Court stated that:
to act “under color of’ state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting “under color” of law for purposes of § 1983 actions. Of course, merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or ajoint actor with the judge. But here the allegations were that an official act of the defendantjudge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge. Under these allegations, the private parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state law; and it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability. Immunity does not change the character of the judge’s action or that of his co-conspirators. . . . Private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such conduct are thus acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 as it has been construed in our prior cases.
Id. at 27-29 (footnotes and citations omitted, emphasis added).
9. Bell At/i Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). Accord Rescuecoin Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009).
10. Ofori-Tenkorang v. American Int’l Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 2006).
11. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
12. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“[WJe do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).
13. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
15. Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)).
16. Bussey v. Phillips, 419 F. Supp. 2d 569, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in original).
17. Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 325 (quoting Dwares v. City of N.Y., 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted)).
18. Pangburn, 200 F.3d at 65 (quoting Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1994)).
19. Romer v. Morgenthau, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Thus, if a plaintiff cannot sufficiently allege a violation of his rights, it follows that he cannot sustain a claim of conspiracy to violate those rights.”).
20. Bussey, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (quoting Young v. County of Fulton,160 F.3d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1998)). Accord Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff 63F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that a section 1983 conspiracy claim “will stand only insofar as the plaintiff can prove the sine qua non of a § 1983 action: the violation of a federal right”) (citing Adickes v. 5.11. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
150 (1970)).
21. Plaintiff claims that Agnes’s death on August 4, 1998, was caused by a stroke “procured deliberately by stress from [defendant Williamj Griffin instigated through [the] Surrogate’s Court.” Compl. ¶ 62.
22. See id. ¶ 6 (“Defendants as individual lawyers, in various positions, created or furthered systemic corruption in New York State for the purpose of furthering deceptions to steal control of the Carvel family’s. . . assets — to the total exclusion of the legitimate asset owners and their successors in interest.”); ¶ 7 (“The fundamental mechanism that makes such corruption possible is the deprivation to Pamela Carvel (and others) of all legitimate avenues of redress of grievances or judicial abuses because of intentional and negligent collusion by State employees charged with protection of Pamela Carvel (and all other citizens).”).
23. Id. . ¶ 11
24. Id. . ¶ 29
25. Id. . ¶ 69-70.
26. Id. . ¶ 71.
27. Id. . ¶ 75
28. See id. ¶ 77. According to plaintiff Scarpino, in a written decision, “specifically denied responsibility over ethical and professional complaints against Streng and his firm.” fd. ¶ 24. Plaintiff fails to explain the significance of how and when Scarpino “denied responsibility” for Streng’s conduct and how this alleged denial violated any of her constitutional rights.
29. Id. . ¶ 77.
30. Id. . ¶ 84.
31. Id. . See id. Plaintiff does not identify to whom the mortgage from Hudson Valley Bank was made.
32. Id. ¶ 85. Once again, plaintiff fails to identify how this “real estate scheme” was presented to Justice Scarpino.
33. For example, plaintiff fails to explain the basis of her property interest in her aunt’s residence. Presumably, Pamela Carvel was the beneficiary, or a beneficiary, of Agnes Carvel’s estate but this is not specifically alleged in connection with the Ardsley residence.
34. I need not decide whether plaintiff has asserted plausible claims against Justice Scarpino as the Second Circuit held that he is shielded from suit under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. See Carvel, 2010 WL 889326, at *1.
Posts
49 comments:
I guess good ole' Shira couldn't hide behind her friends forever. It'll be interesting to see what life this brings, if any, to the widespread oversight corruption.
I hope Carvel does something to bring the focus BACK on Scarpino AND ALL THE JUDGES AND ANIMALS AT THE CJC AND THE DCC. Not the greatest order but it's something big, that's for sure. I'm going to file a complaint against Shiendlin, she's a very bad judge, just trying to protect O'Hagen Wolf and Sherry Cohen.
While conclusory allegations may be insufficient, “conspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations,’ and may have to be proven by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.
like that Obama Bin Laden guy, the one they can't find who started the war and the weapons of mass destruction they can't find......
but they got tapes of the guy! to keep up the war!
Pro Se it when your rights are violated, when the judges and lawyers have stolen as much as they can, they then use the law to circumvent the law to make it cost you!
In sum, the remaining individual Defendants could also be deemed to be state actors if there is a sufficient factual basis to conclude that they conspired with Crud, or any other state actor, to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right!
hey Wojtaszek, Flynn and Ottaviano how did you guys get your jobs at Townsends? does that mean the other State Actors get their jobs there?
Judge Scarpino is a weasel who is jammed up on this one and in the end no one is going to protect him, tough luck Tony, payback is a bitch but ambush is a REAL mother TOny.
Thank You Pamela Carvel for perseverance, endurance and more and traveling to Albany for the June 8, 2009 hearing testimony and for much more.
This could be the knocking down of the domino that makes it all collapes and brings real change.
This is welcomed news despite the dismissal as it is only a dismissal "without prejudice" to amend.
Good luck on the amendments!
from the Hudson Valley Region
I ask why is Bernadette E. Lupinetti, Esq. still free selling children. This criminal is been protected by Judges in the Orange County Supreme Court, Orange County Family Court, the Orange County DA's Office and most disturbing the Office of Attorney General Andrew Cuomo. Some of the children are been sold to be sexually exploited, Cuomo are you fighting child porn or promoting it by helping roaches like Lupinetti avoid investigations that will lead to her arrest and the arrest of her friends such as Judges, Attorneys, ADAs, DAs, CPS, Forensic Experts "assigned" by the court and the rest of criminal friends. Stop selling our American Children indicent Officers of the Court been paid with our tax money.
But here the allegations were that an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge.
Define "Official" please...
It is criminal to give Judge Scarpino a free pass. So one Judge gives another Judge a free pass, that's just dandy. A Judge could commit murder and get a free pass from another Judge. They hav e the illegal system rigged.
you see they gotta have stuff on each other, so they will cover for each other and if you don't play they will just make stuff up till you leave........Low Life Club of Limited Liability Corporation....
Every corrupt judge and court employee in New York is fuming at Tony Scarpino.... he and his Westchester hoods got too greedy, and now everyone is going to pay. Not smart, Tony, not smart.
dear anthony scarpino, enjoy your brief break. soon you'll be facing criminal charges before a real court, before a real judge. you'll be wearing handcuffs.
Carvel keep kicking this crud till they melt!
Tony Scarpino is dirty and the Feds know it, so why won't they do anything? Who is protecting Tony? A low life like Tony has some dirt on somebody. The West. Co. Surrogate Ct. is a snake pit with the biggest snake Tony running the game. Wonder if any other members of Tony's family received any 'LOANS" from this friendly bank that does a whole lot of business with his court?
Can Carvel get JodyKeltz of the Dasterly Deeds fame in on this deal? She is the court attorney who stole a house from an estate she just happen to be assigned.
Scarpino is running for re-election .....this November and is now trying to get endorsements ...
Hey, maybe his old pals over at the FBI would like to endorse him if you know what I mean.
The BROTHEL call the West. Surrogate Ct. has a new tag - NOW IT CAN BE CALLED THE KILLING COURT - THAT"S RIGHT THE KILLING COURT! Ms. Lefkowitz who's sad story appears elsewhere on this blog died of cancer because the West. Surrogate Ct. wouldl not give her the money needed for her cancer treatments that she was entitled to have. The KILLERS are SCARPINO; MURPHY; SCOTT; STRENG and the defacto felon THE BANK OF NEW YORK. They did this dasterly act because they couldn't get the best of her in the courts - she was an attorney who represented herself and would not hire an attorney to represent her since all the ones she hired had sold her out! When will they be brought to JUSTICE for the murder?
I didn't know Ms. Lefkowitz, but I pray that she is resting peacefully. For anyone to have to endure this oppressive abuse from the clerk's that allegedly work for us is beyond the pail. I am also a victim of these "KILLERS" and one more name I would like to add is Scarpino's henchmen Rob DiBella.....he's a THUG in a suit with a law degree, who is now a Judge thanks to his mentor Scarpino. It's all a total disgrace.
Tony pulled another good one recently. He held a trial in a Trust Matter involving the accountings of the Manny Trusts by Bankers Trust Company (now Deutsche Bank) a federal felon where Tony had worked. The problem is he didn't notify the players before he started this trial that he had worked at the "Bank" and that was a conflict. Shame on you Tony! What are they paying you to fix this one Tony? You know the rules, you have to reveal all conflicts. How does anyone know the conflicts unless you reveal them? LOL
If Federal Judges indicated that there was the appearance of a BRIBE. Hello! When do the Federal types begin the investigations? When is the TRIAL? Does Judge Scarpino get a FREE PASS just because he happens to be a JUDGE? Something is WRONG with this situation! Who are the people who are protecting Judge Scarpino?
Shira baby what are you doing? What is really going on with this whole deal?
When Tony and his crew are in handcuffs then I will begin to have some faith in the system. At this time it's all a big fraud and everyone knows it. The gangsters are running the show and you can't trust the government because they know this and do nothing
I personally know how hard Ms. Lefkowitz (an attorney) labored on the legal matters of the sizeable Estates of her father and mother. I also know that Judge Scarpino and the Westchester Surrogate Court as well as the NY County Surrogate Court are duplicitous in their actions in these matters. Ms. Lefkowitz at one time went to the FBI with documentation of the corruption of The Bank of New York, the Surrogate's Courts and the various attorneys including the fixer Frank Streng of McCarthy Finger. The FBI agent then took all this confidential information and revealed it all to The Bank of New York. The 'Bank' then used the papers to retaliated against her with the help of the courts of course. So much for the FBI and Justice! Wonder what the agent's reward was? Maybe a job at The Bank of New? What a nice way to cover things up and who would ever figure it out!
The Moral is DON'T TRUST THE FBI, YOU WITH WIND UP GETTING SCREWED!
What exactly does "the appearance of a bribe" mean? Is this legal speak for Tony took a bribe but, since he's a Judge it's OK? I don't understand? Can someone help me here. Maybe one of Tony's minions that he has promised jobs to when he gets kicked upstair would be good enoughto explain these illegal things to me. What do you say guys and gals?
A Bribe a day keeps the Judge away.
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NY Rabbi Battles for Custody from Officials
RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENTS ESCALATE INTO KIDNAPPINGS AND CPS INVOLVEMENT
(KIRYAS JOEL, NY)—Padwa Chipas Znis through a member of its group, Rabbi Jacob Teitelbaum of Kiryas Joel, NY has recently filed a complaint with the United States District Court—Southern District of New York—against a handful of defendants and co-defendants following false allegations and claims of child neglect.
The result of these false claims led to the removal of Rabbi Teitelbaum’s children from his residence where he lives with his wife. The defendants have gone as far as offering to Rabbi Teitelbaum’s wife to return the children to her if she agrees to separate from Rabbi Teitelbaum.
Having dealing with these ongoing issues for nearly two years, Teitelbaum is emotionally and mentally drained, and is hoping to get some support for his fight.
This all began almost two years ago when Rabbi Teitelbaum and a friend got involved in a religious campaign against forced divorces that were taking place in the community through the use of illegal kidnapping.
“The cause of the harassment and intimidation we received was based on religious disagreements we had within our community,” said Padwa Chipas Znis. “Those individuals with whom we filed the complaint against weren’t merely satisfied with having Rabbi Teitelbaum’s children taken away, but have continued to harass him an attempt to separate him from his wife and evict him from his wife in an effort to stop our campaign.”
“English is not Rabbi Teitelbaum’s native language, and he doesn’t have the finances to hire a big time lawyer to help make this right,” said Padwa Chipas Znis. “His children and family are his life, and it has been an emotional hell dealing with this for almost two years. All he wants is to get his family and his life back in order.”
For information on how you can get involved in taking action in helping Rabbi Teitelbaum to get relief through this case, email HYPERLINK "mailto:info@padwachipasznis.com" info@padwachipasznis.com. Below you will find a copy of the complaint. For more information please visit our Blog http://orangecountyfamilycourt.blogspot.com/
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KJ Village and allied religious groups violate the Constitution and take control of federal and state courts
For more information visit this site
http://www.kiryasjoelvillage.com/
KJ Village and allied religious groups violate the Constitution and take control of federal and state courts
This site was opened to expose the corrupted and fraudulent actions of the religiously controlled Kiryas Joel Village, NY. Together with other religious groups, the leaders of the KJ Village control in a mafia-like manner, often under color of law, how community constituents must behave and block the freedoms of whomever they deem problematic and a threat to their mafia-control system.
The KJ Village has a history of harassing people in the community and abusing its political power to get what they want—regardless of whose rights they trample on—in a way that no other city in this country has ever done. The village and allied religious groups are involved in orchestrated powerful and systemic church and state violations, civil rights violations, violating free speech and freedom of religion, taking control of state and federal courts, and systemic terror against those deemed a problem.
This site and blog is open to anyone, and as the Village and other religious groups continue in the corrupt manner, this site will serve to expose their fraud. Join the fight to stop this abuse of political power.
This federal action was brought by a resident in this Hasidic, ultra-Orthodox, close-knit community of KJ Village, who became a terror victim once he spoke out against criminal actions done under false religious pretenses.
In 2010, he got involved in a campaign to stop forced divorces that have been taking place through the use of criminal kidnappings within the community. Threatened by the campaign, some people aligned with the mafia religious groups in the community tried to silence him by constantly terrorizing and intimidating him. Officials from Orange County and others outside the community where then joined in their campaign to stop him.
After protracted terror and civil rights violations, in which county officials had played along to fraudulently facilitate these violations under color of law, he filed a lawsuit in federal court against his terrorizers, including the KJ Village and Orange County seeking protection and justice.
Subsequently the harassment and intimidation picked up with increased fervor and he soon found himself extremely terrorized, expelled from the Village, and homeless. His family was broken up and his children were taken from him—all in a plot to block his access to courts and stop his involvement in the religious campaign.
The religious groups and the mafia behind this terror in conjunction with the KJ Village then decided to use their powerful connections and political influence to conspire with the County Attorney as well as the other attorneys involved to contact the federal judge presiding over the case, Judge Briccetti, and convince him to back off and turn a blind eye, in the same manner they did with the State Judge.
Not only did Judge Briccetti stop performing his role as a neutral judge, but, acting under the influence of the KJ Village, he also became a participant in furthering the object of the conspiracy. The victim has now brought another lawsuit in federal court to set aside Judge Briccetti’s actions as it was induced by fraud.
For more information visit this site
http://www.kiryasjoelvillage.com/
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